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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the extent to which the social inclusion of lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people matters for technological innovation. The 
central hypothesis, in particular, postulates that the acceptability of LGBT individuals 
helps foster human capital skills, thus strengthening innovation. The reverse holds true 
in societies where significant discrimination against homosexuality prevails. To test this 
proposition, I perform empirical analysis using data for a world sample of countries. 
The results indicate that social tolerance toward homosexuality is positively correlated 
with the economic complexity index, a novel measure of innovation. To achieve causal 
inference, I conduct several falsification exercises, none of which alters the baseline 
findings. Further, individual-level analysis, based on data from the World Values 
Survey, lends strong credence to the international evidence. I also find that LBGT 
inclusion exerts a positive influence on human capital skills, which is a potential 
mechanism explaining the baseline findings.  
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1. Introduction  
The existence of large and persistent disparities in economic prosperity across the world 
remains one of the most perplexing issues facing economists. Some early contributions to this 
line of inquiry hold that the exclusion of women and/or marginalized groups within a society 
matters for international differences in income levels. In particular, there exists a strong 
consensus in this literature that gender discrepancies in various dimensions of empowerment 
and well-being, particularly education, health and employment opportunities, exert a negative 
influence on economic growth and development (e.g., Hill & King, 1995;  Knowles et al., 2002;  
Lagerlöf, 2003;  Klasen & Lamanna, 2009;  Duflo, 2012). Recently, Badgett et al. (2019) 
postulate that the social inclusion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people 
positively affects income per capita. The empirical analysis is mainly based on using an 
internationally comparable index of LGBT inclusion that reflects legal rights and protections 
afforded to LGBT individuals across 132 countries (Badgett et al., 2019).  
Much of the existing literature has focused on estimating the effect of gender differences 
in different aspects of well-being on the worldwide distribution of income levels. By contrast, 
the extent to which the social exclusion of homosexual people matters for economic 
performance is still open to question. Badgett et al. (2019), to the best of my knowledge, is the 
only study investigating the relationship between discrimination against the LGBT community 
and comparative development across the globe. The interest of their paper, however, lies 
exclusively in the effect of the acceptability of homosexuality on income per capita. 
Unfortunately, little is known about the mechanisms through which the social exclusion of 
LGBT people helps shape global income inequality.1 If innovation, as proposed by this 
research, is a key channel through which homosexuality-supportive policies transmit to 
economic growth, we need to understand this reduced-form link. To speak to those debates, 
the current study attempts to examine the effect of the social inclusion of LGBT people on 
technological innovation based on cross-country and individual-level analyses.  
The empirical exercises of this paper are further motivated by three main arguments. 
First, there has been significant progress in the acceptability of homosexuality in many 
Western societies. By contrast, substantial discrimination against LGBT people remains 
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 The empirical evidence of Badgett et al. (2019) is mainly drawn from estimating cross-country OLS regressions 
in which the dependent variable is GDP per capita. For this reason, this paper leaves it open to debate whether the 
social inclusion of LGBT people helps promote innovative activities, which are key ingredients of economic 
growth and development. Badgett et al. (2019) also argue that LGBT inclusion affects growth via human capital. 
The authors, however, provide no empirical evidence supporting this transmission mechanism.  
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widespread in much of the developing world (Figure 1). Specifically, homosexual behaviours 
are still illegal and may result in severe punishments, including the death penalty, in many parts 
of Asia, Africa and the Middle East (Bailey et al., 2016). Second, the third Millennium 
Development Goal emphasizes the importance of espousing equality in gender roles (UN, 
2011). Therefore, reducing discrimination against LGBT people is essential for achieving this 
goal. Further, the extent to which we can create an LGBT-supportive environment across the 
world arguably depends on our understanding about the contribution to economic performance 
of the social inclusion of homosexual people. This paper puts forward the idea that promoting 
human rights and protections of the LGBT community helps spur technological innovation and 
economic growth. If my prediction is true, the findings of this study at least partially advocate 
the social inclusion of LGBT people, particularly in developing economies where homophobia 
prevails. Third, technological innovation is widely perceived as a key driver of productivity 
improvements and economic prosperity (Solow, 1957). There also exists an unequal 
distribution of innovation levels across the globe (Figure 2). This necessitates exploring the 
institutional and social environment that nurtures innovative activities.2 
The main objective of this paper is to explore the link between the acceptability of LGBT 
people and cross-country differences in innovative activities. I posit that reducing 
discrimination against homosexual behaviours enhances human capital skills, thus 
strengthening innovative activities. Further, creating an LGBT-friendly environment would 
attract inflows of human capital because it signals the acceptance of diversity, creativity and 
open-mindedness. It follows from this line of reasoning that improvements in the social 
tolerance toward LGBT people can contribute to prosperity through bolstering innovation. The 
proposed hypothesis is tested by performing the empirical analysis at both the macro- and 
micro-level. I first use the LGBT inclusion index of Badgett et al. (2019) to estimate cross-
country OLS regressions. The findings are broadly consistent with my propositions. A number 
of sensitivity tests are conducted to provide a basis for causal inference. I further carry out an 
individual-level analysis based on data from the World Values Survey. The results demonstrate 
that the acceptability of homosexuality is positively correlated with respondents’ attitudes 
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 Understanding the drivers of innovation is particularly important given the efforts of the government to spur 
technological progress in many countries all over the world. For instance, recent experience of robust economic 
growth observed in several Asian economies, including China, was largely induced by technological adoption and 
imitation, along with large savings and investments (Liang, 2010). Thus, the transformation toward innovation-
led growth plays an important role in eliminating large and persistent discrepancies in income per capita across 
the globe. To the extent that LGBT-supportive policies exert an influence in the innovation process, my findings 
help enrich our understanding of the perennial question about comparative development across the world.  
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toward science and technology, and new ideas, creativity, taking risks, adventure and changes. 
This is largely in line with the cross-country evidence. I also find that LGBT inclusion affects 
innovation by reinforcing human capital skills.    
The approach adopted within this research offers a fresh perspective to the following 
strands of research. Specifically, this paper builds upon the literature investigating the 
economic impacts of wide discrepancies in gender roles throughout the world (e.g., Klasen, 
2002;  Knowles et al., 2002;  Lagerlöf, 2003;  Klasen & Lamanna, 2009;  Duflo, 2012). I add 
evidence to this debate that the social exclusion of marginalized groups of a population, 
particularly LGBT people, exerts a positive influence on national innovative capacity – a key 
determinant of economic growth. Furthermore, this research directly relates to several studies 
documenting a relationship between discrimination against LGBT people and firm 
performance (see, for instance, Button, 2001;  Griffith & Hebl, 2002;  Tejeda, 2006;  Brenner 
et al., 2010;  Wang & Schwarz, 2010;  Pichler et al., 2018). Specifically, discrimination against 
homosexual people at the work place is associated with significantly lower levels of job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment among LGBT employees. By contrast, LGBT-
supportive policies in the work environment reduce job anxiety among gay and lesbian 
employees. These factors are ultimately conducive to firm productivity.  
The present research is also in line with various studies demonstrating that the 
acceptability of homosexuality matters for regional development (Mokyr, 1990;  Florida, 2002, 
2003;  Noland, 2005;  Florida et al., 2008). A strong consensus shared among these studies is 
that social tolerance toward homosexuality signals low barriers to entry of human capital. It 
also creates an environment that supports diversity and creativity. As demonstrated below, 
innovators are generally unconventional people, so any discrimination toward these individuals 
deters innovative activities. My study, however, departs from these papers in two dimensions. 
First, previous studies focus on discrimination against homosexuality at the work place and 
firm performance, while I pay a special attention to the broad social inclusion of LBGT people 
within a society and national innovative capacity. Therefore, the findings drawn from this paper 
are based on estimating a world sample of countries instead of firm-level evidence. Second, 
the empirical analysis of earlier studies is largely based on differences across regions within a 
country, particularly the US. This is mainly attributable to the difficulty of measuring the social 
inclusion of LGBT people across the world. While their analyses advance our understanding 
about discrimination against homosexuality and economic development in a specific country, 
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the evidence cannot be generalized to obtain an overall understanding of the relationship 
between LGBT inclusion and prosperity across countries.  
A final distinguishing feature of the current study stems from adopting the economic 
complexity index as a new measure of innovative capacity. As presented in Section 3, this 
proxy for innovation helps address several concerns regarding conventional innovation metrics 
that economist have typically used. By doing this, I directly contribute to an emerging line of 
research examining economic complexity as a driver of economic growth and development 
across countries (e.g., Hausmann et al., 2007;  Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009;  Felipe et al., 2012;  
Hausmann et al., 2014;  Hartmann et al., 2017;  Lee & Vu, 2019).3 Importantly, very few studies 
pay attention to the social and institutional environment that shapes the level of economic 
complexity.4 My study, by contrast, reveals that reducing the social exclusion of LGBT people 
plays a key role in affecting economic complexity.  
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical perspective. 
Section 3 discusses problems associated with conventional innovation metrics and the 
motivation for using economic complexity as a new measure of innovation. Section 4 presents 
estimation strategies, followed by a discussion of the cross-country evidence in Section 5. Next, 
I report individual-level evidence and a mechanism analysis in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. 
The main findings are summarized in Section 8.  
2. The economic argument 
The central hypothesis of this paper rests upon the premise that the social inclusion of LGBT 
people helps promote innovative capabilities through enhancing human capital skills. A 
conventional wisdom shared among development economists holds that human capital is a key 
conduit of national innovative capacity, which critically affects productivity and income 
differences across the globe (see, for instance, Nelson & Phelps, 1966;  Murphy et al., 1991;  
Gennaioli et al., 2012). It follows from this line of reasoning that countries endowed with better 
human capital tend to innovate more, because technological innovation arguably has its roots 
from people’s curiosity, imagination, risk-taking and cooperation. By this logic, the social 
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 More details about this indicator will be presented later.  
4
 The determinants of economic complexity have recently gained interests among economists (Sweet & Maggio, 
2015;  Bahar et al., 2019;  Vu, 2019). I differ from these studies by focusing on the social inclusion of LGBT 
people, an issue that remains largely unexplored so far. 
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inclusion of LGBT people promotes innovative activities by accelerating a country’s pool of 
knowledge and skills as presented below.5  
Social tolerance toward LGBT people would allow them to accumulate education, and 
helps improve their health outcomes, income and employment opportunities. I argue that this 
is conducive to enhancement of the quality of human capital of the entire economy. By contrast, 
discrimination against the LGBT community could be detrimental to human capital, thus 
hindering innovation.6 The basic explanation for this holds that the exclusion of the LGBT 
community may force them to drop out of school, thus hindering educational attainment.7 
Further, people facing any discrimination in employment opportunities may end up with 
unproductive occupations or even become unemployed (see, for instance, Bergmann, 1971).8 
In general, the positive effect of the social inclusion of LGBT people on innovation parallels 
conventional arguments that gender differences in education, health and labour market 
opportunities are impediments to human capital accumulation and economic growth (see, e.g., 
Klasen, 2002;  Knowles et al., 2002;  Berik et al., 2009;  Klasen & Lamanna, 2009). 
According to an early view proposed by Mokyr (1990), diversity and tolerance constitute 
the fundamental drivers of the innovation process. Innovative activities, in particular, tend to 
proliferate in places with less discrimination against nonconformists. The main intuition is that 
technological advances critically depend on the social acceptability of unconventional people 
because innovators are mostly eccentric individuals (Mokyr, 1990). Therefore, social tolerance 
afforded to homosexual people spurs creativity, knowledge, skills and innovation. There also 
exists ample empirical evidence supporting the argument that the social inclusion of LGBT 
people fosters technological change and economic outcomes. Florida (2002), for instance, 
documents a positive link between the share of bohemians and the quality of human capital 
                                                          
5
 A more detailed discussion of the theoretical connections between the social inclusion of LGBT people and 
economic performance is provided by Badgett et al. (2019).  
6
 It is widely acknowledged in the epidemiological literature that non-heterosexual people face significantly poorer 
health compared with heterosexual counterparts (e.g., Meyer, 1995, 2003;  Hipple et al., 2011). This arguably 
reduces productivity of LGBT people and increase the social cost, which is ultimately detrimental for a country’s 
technological innovation.  
7
 There exists ample empirical evidence postulating that discrimination against homosexuality negatively affects 
educational attainment in many countries, mostly based on micro-level studies (see, for instance Khan et al., 2005;  
Kosciw et al., 2013).  
8
 Many studies find that non-heterosexual people are discriminated at the work place and in the labour market. 
The employment discrimination, for instance, includes wage disparities (Klawitter, 2015) and less chances of 
being invited for first-round interview (Tilcsik, 2011;  Ahmed et al., 2013;  Drydakis, 2015;  Mishel, 2016). These 
disparities in employment opportunities may result in LGBT people working in less productive sectors or even 
becoming unemployed. For this reason, the national innovative capacity is negatively affected.   
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across regions in the US. Thus, the social tolerance toward marginalized individuals, including 
homosexual people, acts as a catalyst for technological-based industries. Consistent with this 
finding, Florida et al. (2008) indicate that the social inclusion of gays and lesbians is conducive 
to human capital skills and regional development in the US. 
The positive link between LGBT inclusion and innovation is also based on the findings 
of a number of studies demonstrating that treating these marginalized individuals equally at the 
work place results in better firm performance (see, e.g., Griffith & Hebl, 2002;  Tejeda, 2006;  
Wang & Schwarz, 2010;  Pichler et al., 2018). This viewpoint, in particular, asserts that 
reducing any discrimination against LGBT people in the work environment could nurture 
business outcomes because it helps improve productivity of these workers. Furthermore, 
LGBT-friendly policies implemented at the firm level would reduce the negative consequences 
associated with any discrimination against homosexuality, such as health care and absenteeism 
costs (Badgett et al., 2019). According to Button (2001), equal treatment in the work place 
would benefit LGBT employees by improving their mental health and enhance their 
commitment to companies.  
Griffith and Hebl (2002) also find that LGBT-supportive policies are associated with 
lower levels of job anxiety and help improve job satisfaction among gay and lesbian employees. 
Consequently, non-discrimination toward homosexuality enhances firm productivity. 
Additionally, the inclusion of the LGBT community plays an important role in strengthening 
the relationship between these marginalized groups and their co-workers and employers 
(Brenner et al., 2010). This is particularly essential for technology-intensive industries that 
typically require coordination in the work place. Additionally, better cooperation at the firm 
level may arguably enhance the utilization of the existing human capital and bolster innovative 
capabilities. Importantly, firm productivity is an important determinant of national productivity 
and innovation. For this reason, if reducing discrimination against homosexual people fosters 
firm performance, such policies would arguably strengthen national innovative capacity. 
Another argument for why an LGBT-friendly environment matters for national 
innovative capacity lies in the assertion that the acceptability of homosexuality signals low 
barriers to entry of human capital. The main intuition behind this proposition is that places with 
greater social diversity and tolerance are more likely to attract inflows of talents (Florida, 
2003). For this reason, social inclusion of the LGBT community creates an open business 
environment that nurtures diversity and creativity, which is of great importance for immigration 
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and national innovative capacity (Florida, 2003;  Badgett et al., 2019).9 This is particularly 
relevant for the development of technology-intensive industries and economic prosperity when 
examining the effect of LGBT inclusion on innovation from a cross-country framework. 
Noland (2005), for instance, demonstrates that the social tolerance of homosexuality exerts a 
statistically and economically significant influence on foreign direct investment even after 
controlling for a wide range of FDI determinants. Therefore, I argue that innovative activities 
proliferate in countries with better inclusiveness of the LGBT community. 
3. Measuring national innovative capacity 
3.1. Problems with existing innovation metrics 
A key challenge in innovation-related research is to measure national innovative capacity 
across the world in a consistent manner. Conventional proxies for technological innovation 
include the number of patents and R&D expenditure as a proportion of GDP, to name but a 
few. Some concerns about measurement bias induced by using these indicators have been well 
documented (e.g., Varsakelis, 2001;  Duguet & MacGarvie, 2005;  Hong et al., 2012;  Sweet 
& Maggio, 2015;  Fernandez Donoso, 2017). Nevertheless, these innovation metrics remain 
widely adopted in a number of papers, arguably due to their convenience of measurement and 
worldwide comparison (Hong et al., 2012). 
Economists, in particular, have typically made use of R&D expenditure as an input-based 
measure of innovative capabilities, beginning in the late 1950s (Fernandez Donoso, 2017). The 
main advantage of using this index is that it reflects firms’ effort to focus on innovative 
activities, which is an important driver of technological innovation and productivity growth 
(Varsakelis, 2001). Another merit of this indicator lies in the ease of international comparison 
because data have been consistently recorded across countries since the 1950s. However, the 
extent to which R&D spending translates into real innovative capacity critically depends on 
the institutional environment that shapes the efficiency of utilizing this input (Kleinknecht et 
al., 2002;  Sweet & Maggio, 2015).  
By the above logic, we can hardly infer anything about the output side of the innovation 
process from R&D expenditure (e.g., commercially oriented innovation such as the 
introduction of new products, services or processes). Importantly, this measure underestimates 
true innovative capacity in small- and medium-sized firms and low-income countries because 
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 This argument suggests that fostering the social inclusion of the LGBT community can be a potential instrument 
for a country to attract immigration and investments to improve its technological capacity.  
8 
 
firm size and income levels determine how effectively R&D resources are used in the 
innovation process (Kleinknecht et al., 2002). Furthermore, designing R&D survey 
questionnaires is generally skewed toward large-scale conglomerates, thereby missing much 
information about technological innovation of small firms.10 Meanwhile, data obtained in low-
income economies are criticized for being scattered and inconsistent (Sweet & Maggio, 2015). 
An alternative metric, namely the number of patents granted, has been popularly used as 
an (intermediate) output-based indicator of innovative capabilities. This measure has a 
comprehensive coverage of both countries and years. Yet it is still subject to severe 
measurement issues, particularly in low- and middle-income countries that are typically 
technologically backward. Part of the reason is that a “culture of patenting” is much less 
common in poor countries than in the US and other western societies (Sweet & Maggio, 2015). 
This poses a challenge for studies examining the determinants of innovation from a cross-
country perspective (Varsakelis, 2001). Needless to say, measurement bias may provide an 
invalid basis for causal inference.   
Furthermore, in some cases, technological progress takes places in the form of non-
patented or unpatented inventions (Kleinknecht et al., 2002). In this regard, the number of 
patents appears to be an imperfect proxy for innovation when it comes to measuring 
technological advances that are concealed from the patent system. It is also important to note 
that innovation is defined as an incremental process, obtained via the accumulation of both 
tangible (explicit) and intangible (tacit) knowledge (Nelson, 2005). The number of patents 
reflects only the “explicit” side of innovation but it says nothing about “tacit” knowledge 
(Nelson, 2005;  Sweet & Maggio, 2015). Moreover, some patents are never translated into 
commercially valuable products, and they may be largely irrelevant for economic prosperity.11 
Thus, counting the number of patents reflects inventions rather than the national innovative 
capacity per se. It follows from these arguments that using conventional measures of innovation 
may be subject to measurement bias. 
3.2. Economic complexity index – a novel measure of innovation 
                                                          
10 More specifically, Kleinknecht et al. (2002) demonstrate that R&D survey questionnaires are much more 
confusing for small firms than for large-scale firms. This is attributable to the fact that R&D spending is typically 
not well organized in small firms, making the nature of R&D expenditure questions more perplexing in these 
firms (e.g., the difference between applied and basic R&D, and sources of funding).  
11
 Duguet and MacGarvie (2005) employ patent citations to quantify the cross-country variation in innovative 
capacity. Using this index, however, does not help address some well-known concerns about the patent-based 
measure of innovation mentioned above. 
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The above discussion suggests that the choice of innovation metrics is non-trivial. The criticism 
of traditional innovation measures holds that the estimated effect of LGBT inclusion on 
technological innovation can be biased and inconsistent if R&D spending or the number of 
patents are only weakly correlated with national innovative capacity. Motivated by this 
potential measurement bias, this paper endeavours to capture cross-country differences in 
innovation by using the economic complexity index (ECI). Below, I argue that this measure 
helps address several measurement issues of conventional innovation metrics.  
Innovative activities generally take place in the form of creating new products, services, 
and processes (Hong et al., 2012). This allows an economy to foster productivity growth, thus 
achieving a higher level of income (Grossman & Helpman, 1991;  Coe & Helpman, 1995). 
Therefore, the national innovative capacity critically hinges on the stock of “tacit” and 
“explicit” knowledge available within a country. For this reason, innovation can be directly 
inferred from the availability of productive capabilities embedded in an economy and its ability 
to assimilate and exploit existing knowledge. Incorporating this idea in a quantitative indicator, 
Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) develop the ECI index in which the accumulation of productive 
knowledge is attributable to the type of products a country can produce and export with 
revealed comparative advantage. 
As scholars struggle to capture tacit (intangible) knowledge, which constitutes part of the 
innovation process, the novelty of the ECI index lies in its exploitation of information on the 
type of products made by an economy. Specifically, Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) formalize 
this idea by using two concepts to quantify the level of economic complexity across countries, 
including “diversity” and “ubiquity”. First, diversity captures the number of products a country 
can produce. The central idea holds that a country is endowed with a larger set of productive 
knowledge if it can make a diverse range of products. Moreover, product diversification 
arguably reflects the ability to assimilate and utilize innovative capabilities to create 
commercially valuable products, which is relevant for technological progress and economic 
growth. This measurement method attempts to incorporate tacit knowledge and transferable 
skills of production, which are difficult to capture by conventional innovation metrics. 
Importantly, innovation does not merely encompass inventions, as reflected by the number of 
patents. The ECI index, by contrast, reflects the extent to which a country can utilize the 
creation of knowledge in production, which is particularly important for economic prosperity.  
Second, ubiquity reflects product sophistication as it measures whether a country’s 
products are popularly produced in many other economies. Low-ubiquity products (e.g., 
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smartphones, machinery, chemicals and metals), which require many hard-to-find capabilities, 
are generally produced only in a few economies (Felipe et al., 2012). This is because the 
production of sophisticated products is viable only in places where prerequisite technologies 
and knowledge are available. By contrast, ubiquitous products (e.g., agricultural, wood, raw 
materials and commodities, and textiles), can be easily produced as they require much less 
productive knowledge (Felipe et al., 2012). For example, Japan, Germany and the US, among 
others, are the most complex economies in the world because they can produce a diverse range 
of low-ubiquity products, such as medical imaging and machinery. Meanwhile, Cambodia, 
Papua New Guinea, and Nigeria are relatively technologically backward because they mainly 
produce ubiquitous commodities. These arguments, taken together, suggest that innovative 
economies are those whose productive structure comprises of a wide range of technologically 
sophisticated products, evidenced by a high ECI index. 
To summarize, this paper seeks to overcome several measurement issues of commonly 
used metrics of innovation such as R&D expenditure and patents. To this end, I employ the 
ECI index that takes a more nuanced approach toward quantifying internationally comparable 
innovative capabilities. More specifically, this output-based measure of innovation covers 
knowledge embodied  in commercially oriented and value-added products, which is more 
relevant for economic growth and development (Sweet & Maggio, 2015). This accounts for 
much of technological innovation that cannot be reflected in non-patented inventions. This 
approach goes well beyond the input-based measure of knowledge and innovation (e.g., R&D 
expenditure) by focusing on the output side of the innovation process. It also reflects whether 
an economy is improving its productive capacity and creating innovation, which accelerates 
productivity and income growth (Bahar et al., 2014;  Hausmann et al., 2014). Furthermore, it 
attempts to account for not only explicit but also tacit knowledge to capture a more 
comprehensive coverage of innovative activities. The ECI index demonstrates a country’s 
ability to apply its technologies and productive knowledge in enhancing innovative capacity. 
Importantly, this measure is calculated in a consistent manner across countries and over time, 
relying on information about the type of products made and exported by an economy.  
While the ECI index appears to be a novel innovation metrics, it is not free from criticism. 
A major concern holds that the construction of this indicator is based on trade data, which do 
not account for innovation stemming from non-tradeable activities (Sweet & Maggio, 2015). 
It also focuses only on trade in manufacturing rather than in services. The ECI builds upon the 
idea of traditional innovation metrics by capturing explicit knowledge, but it further 
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incorporates tacit knowledge. An increase in economic complexity also implies a country’s 
ability to accumulate productive knowledge and translate it into innovative products.  
Additionally, the limitation of input-based innovation metrics (R&D expenditure) can be 
evident when looking at data of macro-economically similar countries. For example, Malaysia 
and Brazil are relatively comparable in terms of their income per capita, which are 
approximately 10751USD and 11351USD in 2015, respectively. Similarly, these two countries 
spent around 1.2% to 1.3% of their GDP on R&D in 2015.12 By contrast, Brazil still lags behind 
Malaysia in innovative capacity, evidenced by the Global Innovation Index. More precisely, 
Malaysia ranked 32nd in the global innovation ranking while Brazil placed at 70th in 2015.13 
Hence, the measure of R&D spending fails to compare innovation in these two countries. 
Importantly, Malaysia’s ECI index is around 0.93 in 2015, which is nearly 2.5 times higher 
than that of Brazil.14 This is consistent with the innovation ranking, suggesting that the ECI 
index provides better information about cross-country differences in innovative capacity 
compared with R&D spending. The remainder of this paper, therefore, relies on using the ECI 
index to explore the effect of health capital on innovation.  
4. Estimation strategies 
Model specification 
To estimate the causal effect of LGBT inclusion on economic complexity, a novel measure of 
innovative capabilities, I set up the following cross-country OLS model. 𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝐺𝐵𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝐸𝐶𝐼 denotes the economic complexity index, the main measure of innovative capacity. 𝐿𝐺𝐵𝑇 stands for the LGBT inclusion index of Badgett et al. (2019), which is the main variable 
of interest in this paper. 𝛽 captures the estimated effect of the social inclusion of LGBT on 
national innovative capacity. 𝑋 corresponds to the set of control variables that will be discussed 
below. Subscript i denotes country i, taking values ranging from one to up to 116.15  𝜀 reflects 
the unobserved error term. 
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 Both data on GDP per capita and R&D spending is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (https://wdi.worldbank.org).  
13
 The global innovation index is an alternative proxy for innovative capacity. This measure is highly correlated 
with ECI. Later, I will also use this metric as a sensitivity check and present some details.  
14
 Data are taken from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (https://oec.world/en/rankings/country/eci/). 
15
 The list of countries used in this paper is provided in the online appendix. 
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It is important to discuss the motivation for estimating cross-sectional data to explore the 
link between LGBT inclusion and innovation. First, the main interest of the current study lies 
in the impact of the social inclusion of LGBT people on the cross-country variation in 
innovative capabilities. Estimating a cross-country regression, therefore, is relevant for this 
purpose. This empirical exercise is also relevant for capturing the long-term relationship 
between ECI and LGBT inclusion, of which the differences across countries remains relatively 
constant over the years. Second, the LGBT index, constructed by Badgett et al. (2019), exhibits 
little variation within a country across years. This time-series property is consistent with the 
observation that social tolerance toward homosexuality appears to be a persistent cultural 
feature of the population. Therefore, the main variation in the data stems from pooling data 
across countries. Later, I will present evidence that the effect of social inclusion of LGBT 
people on innovation across the world remains largely unchanged when I compute the average 
of the LGBT index across different periods. 
Data and variables16 
This paper draws on a recent contribution of Badgett et al. (2019) that constructs an index 
reflecting the social inclusion of LGBT people across 132 countries (Figure 1). As discussed 
earlier, this index is computed from 1966 to 2011, but it is changing slowly over the years 
within a country. This is consistent with the argument that the acceptability of homosexuality 
is presumably a persistent culture feature of the society. Thus, much of the variation of the data 
is induced by cross-country differences in the extent to which LGBT individuals are 
discriminated in a population. Thus, I calculate the average of this index across the period from 
1966 to 2011 for each of 132 countries. I further conduct a sensitivity to show that the main 
results are not driven by the period chosen.  
The social inclusion of LGBT people can be measured by differences in different aspects 
of well-being, such as health outcomes, earnings and education, between homosexual and 
heterosexual people in a given country. Unfortunately, such data are not available across 
countries throughout the world. The interest of the current research, by contrast, lies 
exclusively in the effect of the social acceptability of homosexuality on disparities in innovative 
capabilities across countries. Thus, the empirical analysis requires using an internationally 
comparable index reflecting the tolerance toward LGBT people. For this reason, I employ the 
LGBT inclusion index that captures the extent to which homosexual people are afforded legal 
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 See also the online appendix for more details. 
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rights and protections. This is derived from the original Global Index of Legal Recognition of 
Homosexual Orientation introduced by Waaldijk (2009). 
As argued earlier, this paper attempts to address several concerns about the use of 
conventional innovation metrics by adopting the economic complexity index.17 This indicator 
is constructed based on the method of reflections proposed by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009). 
Specifically, the authors develop an iterative algorithm combining information on countries’ 
diversity and products’ ubiquity as discussed earlier. This method yields a single ECI for each 
countries from 1964 to 2010. I calculate the mean values for each countries to use in the cross-
country analysis.18  
I follow a recent study by Vu (2019) to select the set of control variables included in the 
baseline regressions.19 A potential confounder is trade liberalization, which promotes national 
innovative capacity and productivity through enhancing the dissemination of knowledge and 
skills across borders (see, e.g., Edwards, 1997;  Baldwin & Gu, 2004;  Sweet & Maggio, 2015). 
Further, financial development may foster technological innovation as suggested by Hsu et al. 
(2014). Government size may exert a positive influence on the development of technology-
intensive industries through providing public resources including education, health care, public 
order and legal systems (e.g., Sweet & Maggio, 2015;  Vu, 2019). Innovative activities, 
measured by ECI, may just reflect the size of a country’s population. The explanation is that 
the population size corresponds to diversity of ideas and creativity. A bigger market size may 
correspond to the product diversification that the measure of innovation used in this paper 
captures. Further, population size may capture the extent to which my findings just proxy for 
the effect of increasing returns to scale of export productivity (Sweet & Maggio, 2015). 
Therefore, I include these variables as baseline controls. Data are obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. Additionally, a series of other potential confounders 
will be incorporated in the regression as sensitivity analyses.   
Estimation methods  
A key challenge in achieving causal inference stems from potential omitted variable bias. 
Specifically, if an unobserved variable is correlated with both social tolerance toward LGBT 
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 Data are obtained from the Observatory of Economic Complexity. 
18
 For more details about the construction of this index, please see Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) and Hausmann 
et al. (2014). Alternative measures of innovation will be used as a robustness check later.  
19
 To my knowledge, Vu (2019) is among very few studies exploring the determinants of economic complexity 
across countries with a special focus on the quality of institutions. Several control variables included in this paper 
are also relevant for the current study, given that the main measure of innovation here is ECI.  
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people and ECI, the estimated coefficients (𝛽) are biased and inconsistent. To obtain unbiased 
and consistent estimates, I follow the existing comparative development literature in 
incorporating a number of potential confounders in the regression (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2009, 
Ch. 4). This helps mitigate the concern that the results may just reflect the effect of a third 
omitted factor (Vu, 2020).  
It is worth noting that reverse causation is unlikely to exist in this case because it is 
difficult to justify the direct influence of innovative activities on social tolerance toward the 
LGBT community. One may argue that the development of technology-intensive industries 
would trigger structural change in institutional quality, coupled with economic growth. This 
may improve the acceptability of homosexuality within a country. As such, the potential bias 
is induced by the effect of either institutional quality or income per capita on LGBT inclusion 
rather than reverse causality per se.20 For this reason, I will rule out this possibility by 
controlling for these potential confounders in a sensitivity test presented later.   
5. Cross-country evidence 
5.1. Main results 
Figure 3 represents the unconditional cross-country correlation between the social inclusion of 
the LGBT community and innovative capacity, measured by ECI. Accordingly, the 
acceptability of LGBT people is positively correlated with national innovative capabilities. 
This finding lends support to the main hypothesis discussed earlier. It suggests that countries 
with better legal rights and protections afforded to homosexual people are associated with 
higher levels of economic complexity, which corresponds to better ability to innovate. 
Nevertheless, this unconditional correlation should be interpreted with care because it does not 
necessarily imply a causal influence when I do not control for any confounding factors.  
The baseline findings, which measure the partial effect of the LGBT inclusion index on 
innovation, are presented in Table 1. In column (1), I report the unconditional estimates. 
Accordingly, the estimated coefficients of LGBT is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. This is consistent with the positive correlation shown in Figure 3. From columns (2) 
to (5), I gradually incorporate each of the main control variables in the regression. These factors 
arguably exert some influence on national innovative capacity. Thus, including them in the 
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 Indeed, it is relatively difficult to identify sources of exogenous variation in the social inclusion of LGBT people 
across countries. This is partly explained by the fact that macro-level research on determinants of the acceptability 
of homosexuality throughout the world is largely non-existent.  
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benchmark model helps mitigate concerns about omitted variable bias. The results presented 
in Table 1 demonstrate that the estimated effect of the social inclusion of LGBT individuals 
appears to be very precise even when I account for the impact of potential confounding factors. 
More specifically, a one-unit increase in the LGBT index is associated with a 0.32-unit increase 
in ECI, approximately one third of a standard deviation of ECI, a sizeable effect (column 5, 
Table 1).21 This lends strong credence to the main proposition.  
Trade openness is expected to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge and technologies, 
which may foster technological innovation. This paper, however, finds that the effect of trade 
liberalization on innovative capacity, measured by ECI, is imprecisely estimated (column 2, 
Table 1). Therefore, I do not find evidence supporting the argument that trade is a key factor 
affecting the innovation process. In contrast, the effect of financial development, government 
size, and population on ECI is positive and statistically significant at conventionally accepted 
levels (columns 3 to 5, Table 1). This is in line with the findings of previous studies (e.g., Hsu 
et al., 2014;  Sweet & Maggio, 2015;  Vu, 2019).  
5.2. Robustness checks 
As highlighted above, the baseline findings may not provide a valid basis for causal inference 
if an omitted factor is correlated with both the dependent variable and the main variable of 
interest. This motivates including a rich set of potential confounding factors to minimize this 
potential bias. Below, I further perform some additional sensitivity tests and discuss the results. 
Robustness to including additional controls 
I replicate the baseline findings in column (5) of Table 1 by including a series of potential 
confounders as presented in Table 2. First, I account for the effect of the diversity of birthplaces 
of immigrants.22 This is mainly motivated by some recent contributions linking birthplace 
diversity and economic development (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 2016;  Bahar et al., 2019). In 
particular, Bahar et al. (2019) find that an index of population diversity is positively correlated 
with ECI, the baseline innovation metric used in this paper. It may also be the case that 
countries with greater social tolerance toward LGBT people would attract immigrants, thus 
enhancing population diversity. The results shown in column (1) indicate that my findings are 
robust to accounting for this effect. Interestingly, the effect of birthplace diversity on ECI is 
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 A summary statistics of variables is provided in the online appendix. 
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 Data are taken from Alesina et al. (2016) who document a strong and robust effect of birthplace diversity on 
income differences across the world.  
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imprecisely estimated, which is in contrast to Bahar et al. (2019). This suggests that 
discrimination toward LGBT people plays a more prominent role in affecting innovation. 
Second, I control for the effect of legal origins by including dummy variables of common 
law and mixed law.23 The explanation for this holds that common law with greater protection 
of private property rights may be conducive to innovative activities. Further, this partly 
addresses a concern that my results just reflect the persistent effect of colonization on 
comparative development across countries (Acemoglu et al., 2001;  La Porta et al., 2008). The 
baseline findings, however, remain relatively insensitive to this empirical exercise (column 2, 
Table 2).24 Third, I control for the effect of land suitability and the abundance of resources 
because these factors may affect technology-intensive industries, following Vu (2019). The 
results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 are broadly similar to the baseline findings. Finally, 
my results may yield a spurious relationship between the social inclusion of LGBT people and 
innovation if I fail to control for the quality of institutions and income levels as highlighted 
earlier. For this reason, I incorporate the measures of democracy, institutional quality, and 
income per capita in columns (5) to (7) of Table 2.25 Accordingly, the estimated coefficients of 
LGBT are still positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. When all of the additional 
control variables are included in the regression, the estimated impact of the social tolerance 
toward homosexuality remains precise at conventionally accepted levels of significance 
(column 8, Table 2).26 Overall, I find that the baseline findings are largely robust to controlling 
for a number of confounding factors. 
Robustness to alternative samples   
As illustrated in Figure 1, much of the social exclusion of LGBT people remains 
widespread in many parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. By contrast, European and 
Oceania countries have achieved significant progress toward enhancing the social acceptability 
of homosexuality (Bailey et al., 2016). Figure 2 also demonstrates spatial dependence in 
innovation across the globe. One implication from this spatial distribution across the globe is 
that the benchmark estimates may just proxy for some unobserved region-specific factors. As 
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 I follow the classification of Klerman et al. (2011). Countries adopting civil law are excluded as the base group.  
24
 Although the size of the coefficients reduces a little, the positive effect of LGBT inclusion on innovation is still 
precisely estimated.  
25
 Democracy is proxied by the polity2 index taken from Marshall et al. (2014). Further, I calculate the average 
of six governance indicators obtained from the World Bank’s data to capture institutional quality. GDP per capita 
is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
26
 Most of additional controls are highly correlated. Thus, including all of them in one regression would reduce 
efficiency of the estimates. However, the main results are largely robust to doing this.  
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such, the positive correlation established earlier may be spurious. To address this concern, I 
reproduce the baseline estimates by gradually removing some countries located in the same 
continent (columns 1-5, Table 3). Next, I exclude countries whose LGBT inclusion index 
equals zero because they are potential outliers as shown in Figure 3 (column 6, Table 3). As a 
final test, I include dummy variables for each continent (column 7, Table 3). The results based 
on estimating alternative samples in Table 3 are broadly similar to the baseline findings. 
Robustness to controlling for religion and culture values 
Individuals sharing common religious beliefs may arguably possess the same cultural 
traits. This may exert some influence on the social tolerance toward homosexuality while 
affecting the national innovative capacity. Cultural values may also drive innovation and 
attitudes toward homosexual behaviours through affecting institutional quality. For example, 
the level of social capital, which may vary across cultures and religions, may be conducive to 
coordination at the work place, and the exchange of ideas, knowledge and skills within an 
economy. These factors help foster technological innovation. Meanwhile, the lack of social 
trust could hinder the inclusion of homosexual people in a population. Moreover, 
individualistic cultures may drive technological innovation by affecting the institutional 
environment as highlighted by Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017). Collectivistic societies tend 
to punish those deviating from norms and standards and emphasize conformity. Hence, it may 
spur the social exclusion of the LGBT community. These arguments, taken together, suggest 
that the baseline estimates may be biased and inconsistent if we fail to account for cross-country 
differences in cultural and religious values. This motivates the falsification test presented in 
Table 4.27 I find that the effect of the social inclusion of LGBT people on innovation remains 
precisely estimated even when I control for different measures of culture values and religions. 
Importantly, this falsification exercise also helps address a concern that the benchmark findings 
just proxy for the effect of overall tolerance for diversity and nonconformists.   
Robustness to potential measurement bias 
As demonstrated above, I calculate the mean values of the LGBT inclusion index across 
the period from 1966 to 2011. This is mainly motivated by an observation that the acceptability 
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 In particular, I control for social capital based on data from the World Values Survey. This index measures the 
number of respondents who answer that “most people can be trusted” as a proportion of total respondents. Next, 
I incorporate the Hofstede’s index of individualistic cultures in the regression. This indicator is constructed by 
Hofstede (2001). Further, I include religious variables, calculated by the fraction of Catholics, Muslims, and 
Protestants in the population, following La Porta et al. (1999).  
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of homosexuality, as measured by the LGBT index, exhibits little variation across the years 
with a country. One may well argue that the baseline estimates may be driven by the period 
chosen to compute the LGBT inclusion index. To address this concern, I reproduce the 
benchmark results by using the main variable of interest computed in different years. The 
results presented in Table 5 indicate that the estimated coefficients of the LGBT index remain 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This reinforces the main hypothesis that fostering 
human rights and protection of LGBT people helps strengthen innovative activities. 
ECI was first adopted as a proxy for innovative activities by Sweet and Maggio (2015). 
As presented above, this innovation metric helps address several pitfalls of using traditional 
measures of innovative capacity. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the baseline 
findings are merely driven by the use of this index. Further, I calculate the average of ECI from 
1964 to 2010 in the main regressions, which may arguably induce some concerns of 
measurement bias. For these reasons, I employ alternative innovation metrics to replicate the 
baseline results (Table 6). In particular, I use the Global Innovation Index, which reflects cross-
country differences in innovative capacity and the ability to apply innovation in production 
(column 1, Table 6).28 Next, I use an alternative measure of economic complexity, namely the 
Fitness index constructed by Tacchella et al. (2012).29 Results are presented in column 2 of 
Table 6. I further compute the average of ECI from 2000-2010, the most recent decade when 
data are available and use it as a dependent variable in column 3 of Table 6.   
The original ECI has been widely adopted in previous studies exploring its effect on 
economic performance (see, e.g., Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009;  Hausmann et al., 2014;  Sweet 
& Maggio, 2015;  Hartmann et al., 2017;  Lee & Vu, 2019;  Vu, 2019). For this reason, I use it 
as the benchmark measure of national innovative capacity. Recently, Albeaik et al. (2017) 
revise the method of reflections of Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) to construct an improved 
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 This index is computed by using a wide range of information such as institutional quality, human capital and 
research, infrastructure for innovation, market and business sophistication, knowledge and technology outputs, 
and creative outputs. The indicator is constructed by Cornell University, INSEAD, and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization. I use data from the most recent report in 2019 (https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii-
2019-report). 
29
 The method of reflections developed by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) relies on information on a country’s 
diversity and a product’s ubiquity to calculate the ECI for each country. Tacchella et al. (2012), however, argue 
that it may be misleading to define a product as complex based on the average of complexity of countries exporting 
such as product. For this reason, the authors demonstrate that a sophisticated product should be exported only by 
highly competitive countries. Thus, Tacchella et al. (2012) develop a non-linear iterative algorithm for computing 
countries’ competitiveness and products’ complexity to address some concerns of the method of reflections of 
Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009). Importantly, the baseline findings remains largely insensitive to using different 
innovation metrics as well as the methods of calculating the ECI.  
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ECI (ECI_plus).30 Specifically, the authors further considers how difficult it is to export each 
product, which helps capture a country’s productive capabilities better as argued by the authors. 
Therefore, I include this measure in column 4 of Table 6. As evident in Table 6, the baseline 
estimates appear to be strong and robust to using alternative measures of innovation.  
Other sensitivity tests 
An additional concern holds that cultural values and innovative capabilities of proximate 
countries may transcend across borders. The basic explanation rests upon the conventional 
wisdom that geographic proximity facilitates trade and knowledge dissemination (see, e.g., 
Eaton & Kortum, 2002;  Keller, 2002). It follows from this argument that distance plays a key 
role in affecting a country’s technologies through enhancing trade and economic interactions. 
Further, countries located in the same region may share common cultural values. If such spatial 
dependence exists, the OLS estimates may reflect a spurious relationship between the inclusion 
of LGBT people and innovation.31 Following Conley (1999), I mitigate this concern by 
computing corrected standard errors in Table 7.32 The baseline findings appear to be largely 
insensitive to this consideration. 
A final falsification test is to check whether the baseline findings are affected by the 
presence of outliers. In a previous robustness check, I restrict the sample to countries whose 
LGBT inclusion index is greater than zero. The results suggest that my findings are insensitive 
to that exercise. Now, I examine this issue more thoroughly by conducting some formal tests 
to identify and remove outliers (see, e.g., Vu, 2019). To this end, I restrict the sample size using 
three different methods (Table 8). In column (1) of Table 8, I calculate the Cook’s distance and 
remove countries with a value greater than four divided by the number of observations. I further 
constrain the sample size to only countries with a standardized residual smaller than 1.96 
(column 2, Table 8). The final exercise is performed by first estimating robust regression 
weights, following Li (1985). Next, the baseline model is re-estimated using these weights 
(column 3, Table 8). Accordingly, the benchmark findings remains statistically significant at 
the 1% level even when I rule out the potential effect of outliers.  
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 Data for the improved ECI are also obtained from the Observatory of Economic Complexity.  
31
 The discussion here suggests that the disturbance term may be correlated across countries, thus violating the 
basic assumption of OLS regression.   
32
 This is done using weighted covariance matrices. The weight equals the inverse of the distance between 
countries and it is assumed zero after a specified threshold. Following the related literature, I specify the thresholds 
as twenty and fifty coordinate degrees (Table 7). Recent studies applying this approach include Ashraf and Galor 
(2013), Borcan et al. (2018) and Vu (2020).  
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6. Subnational evidence from an individual-level analysis 
The cross-country evidence lends strong credence to a positive link between the acceptability 
of the LGBT community and national innovative capabilities. Although I attempt to control for 
a number of confounding factors, the main concern regarding the validity of my results stems 
from the effect of unobserved country-specific factors. It is difficult to account for these 
potential confounders given that the findings are drawn from a cross-country framework. This 
motivates an analysis at the subnational level. Unfortunately, there exists no comprehensive 
dataset of both LGBT inclusion and innovation at the region level across countries. 
Additionally, the construction of such data would be very challenging. Therefore, instead, I 
employ data from the World Values Survey.33 The empirical analysis in this section is mainly 
based on respondents’ attitudes toward homosexuality and technological innovation (Table 9). 
In particular, I use data conducted from face-to-face interviews in up to 100 countries 
throughout the world. I pool data across six waves from 1981 to 2014.34  The main proxy for 
the social inclusion of LGBT people is derived from a question in which respondents are asked 
about the extent to which they think homosexuality is justifiable. Higher values correspond to 
greater acceptability of homosexual behaviours. I adopt seven questions reflecting people’s 
attitudes toward science and technology, and new ideas, taking risks, and changes as dependent 
variables as discussed below.35 Further, control variables are incorporated in all regressions to 
capture individuals’ characteristics. These include age, age squared, income levels, dummy 
variables for male, social trust and educational attainment.36 Country-fixed effects are also 
added to all regressions, which helps control for a number of country-specific factors as 
discussed earlier. I further include religion- and wave-fixed effects in all models.37 
Table 9 reports the estimation results from the individual-level analysis. Accordingly, the 
estimated coefficients of homosexuality are statistically significant at the 1% level except in 
column (6). The positive sign of the coefficients is consistent with my prediction that the 
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 Data can be accessed via this link: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp.  
34
 More specifically, data are collected in six periods including 1981-1984, 1990-1994, 1995-1998, 1999-2004, 
2005-2009, and 2010-2014. The number of countries covered in each regression is reported in Table 9. 
35
 More details about these variables are also provided in the online appendix.  
36
 Social trust is measured by question “most people can be trusted”, taking the value of one if respondents answer 
yes and zero otherwise. Educational attainment is coded in three scales, including lower, middle and upper levels. 
For ease of interpretation, I create two binary variables for middle and upper education, with lower excluded as 
the base group.  
37
 The discussion in the cross-country analysis suggests that people following the same religion may share some 
common cultural values, which may shape their attitudes toward homosexuality and technological innovation. 
This motivates the inclusion of religion dummies.  
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acceptability of LGBT individuals promotes technological innovation. The first dependent 
variable used in column (1) is whether survey participants agree that we depend too much on 
science versus faith (E220). The answers are coded from one to ten with higher values 
corresponding to negative views about science and technology. For ease of interpretation, I 
recode this variable by multiplying it by minus one so that higher values represent positive 
attitudes toward technological advances. The second question is whether respondents agree 
that science and technology are changing our life too fast (E219). Higher values, therefore, 
imply negative views about technological progress. I also recode this question so that higher 
values denote positive views about technological changes (column 2, Table 9). The next 
question is whether respondents think our world is better off because of science and technology 
(column 3, Table 9). As evident in columns (1) to (3) of Table 9, social tolerance toward 
homosexual behaviours exerts a positive influence on attitudes toward science and technology.  
The remaining columns of Table 9 demonstrate the effect of homosexuality on 
respondents’ views about new ideas, taking risks and changes. In column (4), the dependent 
variable is whether survey participants agree that new ideas are better than old ones (E046). 
Further, I use the question about attitudes toward the importance of new ideas and creativity 
(A189). The answers are also coded from one to ten of which higher values mean greater 
disagreements with this view. I also recode this variable to make it easy to interpret the 
findings.38 Next, I use the question in which respondents are asked whether they welcome or 
worry about changes as shown in column (6) (E047). An increase in this variable is associated 
with positive views about changes. The final dependent variable is whether survey participants 
disagree about the importance of taking risks and adventure (A195). For ease of interpretation, 
this variable is also re-calculated by multiplying it by minus one. The estimated coefficients of 
homosexuality are statistically significant at the 1% level when different dependent variables 
are used (except in column 6).39 Taken altogether, my findings suggest that the social 
acceptability of homosexuality has a positive effect on people’s attitudes toward new ideas, 
creativity, changes, adventure and taking risks.  
Overall, the estimates reported in Table 9 demonstrate that people who self-report 
tolerance toward homosexuality tend to have positive attitudes toward technological progress. 
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 This is done by multiplying the variable by minus one.  
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 In column (6) of Table 9, the effect of homosexuality on innovation is positive but imprecisely estimated. It is 
important to note that the dependent variable used in this column contains a lot of missing values, thus constraining 
the sample size significantly.  
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The effect of homosexuality on innovation remains precisely estimated even when I control for 
a series of confounding factors including individuals’ characteristics, unobserved country- and 
time-specific factors. The inclusion of religion dummies also helps address a concern that my 
findings just proxy for other cultural and religious factors. Therefore, the subnational evidence 
established in this section lends strong support to the cross-country results.  
7. Channels of transmission (cross-country evidence) 
The central idea of this paper rests on the premise that strengthening the social acceptability of 
LGBT people helps improve the quality of human capital skills of the entire economy. Further, 
LGBT-supportive policies may also signal low barriers to inflows of human capital. These 
factors are conducive to enhancement of innovative activities. My analyses presented so far 
broadly align with this notion by documenting a robust effect of the LGBT inclusion index on 
innovative capabilities, measured by ECI. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients also 
suggests a sizeable effect of LGBT inclusion on national innovative capacity. This section 
provides evidence on a potential mechanism explaining the baseline findings.  
To this end, I first replicate the benchmark estimates, controlling for different measures 
of human capital skills (Panel A, Table 10). These indicators will be discussed in some details 
below. As evident, the effect of the social inclusion of LGBT people on innovation is still 
precisely estimated at the 1% level of significance. Importantly, the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients reduces significantly when a potential channel of influence is incorporated in the 
regression. The results in column (1) of Panel A, for instance, indicate that the baseline 
estimates decrease to nearly a half when I control for the human capital index. This suggests 
that much of the effect of LBGT inclusion on innovative capacity is working through human 
capital skills. 
Next, I regress the LGBT inclusion index on different measures of human capital skills 
as reported in Panel B of Table 10. Following a recent study by Kraay (2019), I employ the 
new World Bank’s human capital index in column (1) of Panel B. This indicator, in particular, 
captures the expected human capital that a child born today may obtain by the age of 18, 
considering any risks associated with poor health and education prevailing in his or her country 
(Kraay, 2019).40 In column (2) of Panel B, I estimate the effect of the social acceptability of 
homosexuality on years of schooling, which has been widely adopted as a proxy for human 
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 Data can be accessed via this link: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/human-capital-index.  
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capital.41 Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) demonstrate that the measure of cognitive skills 
performs better than years of schooling when it comes to predicting comparative development 
across countries. For this reason, I adopt this index as the dependent variable in column (3) of 
Panel B. In the last column of Panel B, I use an index of national IQs (intelligence) obtained 
from Lynn and Meisenberg (2010). This metric captures the cross-country variation in 
cognitive attainment, which is highly correlated with educational attainment (Lynn & 
Meisenberg, 2010). Using these different proxies for human capital skills, I find that the social 
inclusion of LGBT individuals exerts a positive influence on human capital accumulation 
(Panel B, Table 10). This provides empirical support to the proposition that the acceptability 
of homosexuality affects innovation through enhancing human capital skills. 
The effect of LGBT inclusion on the quality of human capital remains largely robust to 
controlling for a number of confounding factors as shown in Table A1 in the online appendix. 
This empirical exercise is similar to that in Table 2. It is important to note that LBGT-
supportive policies may affect the innovation process through other channels such as national 
creativity. However, a major problem in exploring other potential mechanisms stems from the 
availability of comparable data across the world. Thus, a potential avenue of future research is 
to examine other channels of transmission that would help advance our understanding of the 
relationship between social tolerance toward LGBT individuals and innovation.     
8. Conclusion 
It has been well documented in the literature that gender disparities in many aspects of 
empowerment and well-being, such as education, health and employment opportunities, are 
generally detrimental to economic growth and development (Klasen, 2002;  Knowles et al., 
2002;  Klasen & Lamanna, 2009). Nevertheless, the extent to which discrimination against 
LGBT people affects economic performance has received scant attention among economists. 
This observation is surprising given a growing interest in promoting the social inclusion of 
LBGT and other marginalized groups of a population in many parts of the world. To the extent 
fostering social inclusiveness of the LGBT community contributes to enhancing social justice 
and economic development, we need to understand properly this link before proposing 
appropriate policy suggestions. 
This paper builds upon a recent study by  Badgett et al. (2019) that introduces an index 
of LBGT inclusion across the world. They document a positive effect of the social inclusion of 
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 Data are taken from Barro and Lee (2013).  
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LGBT people on income per capita using a world sample of countries. The main distinguishing 
feature of the current study lies in postulating that human rights and protection afforded to 
homosexual people play a key role in fostering national innovative capacity. To test this 
proposition, I carry out empirical analysis at the global and subnational level. I also employ 
ECI as a novel measure of innovative activities. This arguably helps address several concerns 
about conventional innovation metrics. The baseline results from estimating cross-country 
OLS regressions lend strong credence to the positive link between LGBT inclusion and 
innovation. My findings also withstand a series of robustness checks. 
To rule out the possibility that the cross-country evidence is confounded by unobserved 
country-specific factors, I further conduct an individual-level analysis, using data from the 
World Values Survey for up to 97 countries from 1981-2014. This allows for accounting for a 
number of potential confounders at the national level. The findings based on this falsification 
test reveal that survey participants who self-report that homosexuality is justifiable have 
positive attitudes toward science and technology, new ideas and creativity, adventure and 
taking risks, and changes. This is broadly consistent with the international evidence. Having 
established a positive link between the social inclusion of LGBT people and national innovative 
capacity, this paper examines a potential mechanism behind this relationship. I find that the 
acceptability of the LGBT community exerts positive influence on different proxies for human 
capital skills, which presumably act as a catalyst for innovation activities. 
To conclude, this research documents a strong and robust effect of LGBT inclusion on 
innovation at both the macro- and micro-level. My findings, however, by no means suggest 
that cross-country differences in innovative capacity are fully attributable to attitudes toward 
homosexuality. Instead, the results imply that reducing discrimination against LGBT people 
may advance economic prosperity through strengthening innovation. Therefore, development 
strategies aiming at inclusive growth should not ignore the social inclusion of marginalized 
groups such as LGBT people. This is because such inclusiveness may further reinforce 
economic development.     
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Figure 1. Cross-country differences in the LGBT inclusion index 
Notes: This figure illustrates the spatial distribution of the social inclusion of LGBT people across the 
world. Higher values correspond to higher acceptability of homosexuality.  
 
Figure 2. Cross-country differences in innovative capacity, as measured by ECI 
Notes: This figure illustrates the spatial distribution of innovative capacity across the world, as 
measured by the economic complexity index. Higher values denotes more innovative capabilities. 
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Figure 3. Correlation between the LGBT inclusion index and technological innovation 
Table 1. Main results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: economic complexity index 
      
LGBT 0.543*** 0.539*** 0.354*** 0.330*** 0.318*** 
 [0.047] [0.048] [0.046] [0.044] [0.045] 
Trade openness  0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Financial development   1.491*** 1.413*** 1.378*** 
   [0.190] [0.182] [0.184] 
Government size    0.038*** 0.046*** 
    [0.010] [0.011] 
Population (log)     0.070* 
     [0.039] 
      
Observations 116 114 112 110 110 
R-squared 0.448 0.443 0.675 0.712 0.721 
Notes: LGBT is the LGBT inclusion index of Badgett et al. (2019), with higher values 
corresponding to better acceptability of homosexuality. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions include an intercept 
estimates but omitted for brevity.  
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Table 2. Robustness to controlling for other effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: economic complexity index 
         
LGBT 0.306*** 0.309*** 0.290*** 0.318*** 0.283*** 0.238*** 0.243*** 0.114* 
 [0.047] [0.056] [0.050] [0.044] [0.048] [0.043] [0.052] [0.061] 
Birthplace diversity -0.337       -0.506 
 [0.308]       [0.315] 
Common law  0.018      -0.176 
  [0.149]      [0.131] 
Mixed law  -0.250      -0.078 
  [0.176]      [0.172] 
Land suitability   0.857***     0.832*** 
   [0.190]     [0.183] 
Fuel exports    -0.002    -0.001 
    [0.001]    [0.002] 
Polity2 index      0.020**   -0.012 
     [0.009]   [0.011] 
Institutional quality      0.391***  0.338*** 
      [0.102]  [0.124] 
GDP per capita (log)       0.197*** 0.172** 
       [0.060] [0.078] 
Baseline controls ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 
        
Observations 109 106 103 110 106 110 110 103 
R-squared 0.725 0.727 0.773 0.728 0.732 0.769 0.752 0.835 
Notes: Baseline controls denote the set of main control variables included in Table 1. ✔ stands for the inclusion of controls. 
Descriptions of additional controls included here are presented in the online appendix. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3. Robustness to sample selection 
 
Excluded continents  Excluding countries  
with zero LGBT index 
 Adding  
continent dummies Europe America Asia Oceania Africa   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
Dependent variable: economic complexity index 
          
LGBT 0.243*** 0.346*** 0.356*** 0.322*** 0.228***  0.301***  0.150*** 
 [0.055] [0.053] [0.051] [0.045] [0.052]  [0.065]  [0.056] 
Baseline controls ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔  ✔ 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Observations 76 89 85 108 85  85  106 
R-squared 0.672 0.740 0.735 0.725 0.674  0.684  0.803 
Notes: In columns (1) to (5), I remove countries in each continent. Next, I drop observations of which the value of the LGBT inclusion 
index equals zero, as presented in column (6). I further include continent dummies in column (7). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Table 2.
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Table 4. Robustness to controlling for cultural values 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: economic complexity index 
     
LGBT 0.288*** 0.293*** 0.322*** 0.249*** 
 [0.053] [0.052] [0.057] [0.071] 
Social trust 0.002   0.003 
 [0.002]   [0.003] 
Individualism  0.609  0.745 
  [0.398]  [0.478] 
Catholic   -0.002 -0.001 
   [0.002] [0.002] 
Muslim   -0.003* -0.003 
   [0.002] [0.002] 
Protestant   -0.002 -0.006 
   [0.003] [0.004] 
Baseline controls ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
     
Observations 89 81 105 75 
R-squared 0.705 0.721 0.725 0.721 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Table 2.  
Table 5. Robustness to measurement of the LGBT inclusion index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: economic complexity index 
      
LGBT inclusion index in 1970 0.230***     
 [0.071]     
LGBT inclusion index in 1980  0.262***    
  [0.070]    
LGBT inclusion index in 1990   0.223***   
   [0.048]   
LGBT inclusion index in 2000    0.181***  
    [0.036]  
LGBT inclusion index in 2010     0.147*** 
     [0.025] 
Baseline controls ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
      
Observations 93 93 110 110 110 
R-squared 0.675 0.693 0.663 0.682 0.715 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to 
Table 2.  
 
  
35 
 
Table 6. Robustness to using alternative innovation metrics 
Dependent variable 
 Global innovation index  Fitness index  ECI  (2000-2010) 
 ECI_plus 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
LGBT   2.980***  0.212***  0.317***  0.300*** 
  [0.613]  [0.074]  [0.054]  [0.054] 
Baseline controls   ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔ 
         
Observations  102  103  110  110 
R-squared  0.728  0.727  0.704  0.655 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Table 
2.  
Table 7. Robustness to spatial dependence 
Independence Twenty coordinate degrees  Fifty coordinate degrees 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: economic complexity index 
      
LGBT index 0.543*** 0.318***  0.543*** 0.318*** 
 [0.047] [0.045]  [0.047] [0.045] 
 (0.034) (0.014)  (0.029) (0.012) 
Baseline controls  ✔   ✔ 
      
Observations 116 110  116 110 
R-squared 0.448 0.721  0.448 0.721 
Notes: I report Conley’s (1999) standard errors that corrects for spatial 
dependence. Conventional robust standard errors are presented in squared 
brackets for the ease of comparison. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Table 8. Robustness to excluding outliers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable is economic complexity 
    
LGBT  0.361*** 0.360*** 0.325*** 
 [0.039] [0.040] [0.040] 
Baseline controls ✔ ✔ ✔ 
    
Observations 103 105 110 
R-squared 0.756 0.767 0.743 
Notes: This paper reproduces the baseline estimates by removing 
potential outliers. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Table 2. 
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Table 9. Individual-level evidence 
Dependent variable 
Attitudes toward science and technology  Attitudes toward new ideas, taking risks and changes 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
E220 E219 E234  E046 A189 E047 A195 
         
Homosexuality 0.055*** 0.022*** 0.015***  0.035*** 0.012*** 0.016 0.015*** 
 [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]  [0.004] [0.002] [0.025] [0.002] 
Male  -0.080*** -0.063*** -0.152***  -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.087 -0.347*** 
 [0.016] [0.022] [0.014]  [0.021] [0.007] [0.086] [0.008] 
Age  0.009*** -0.011*** -0.011***  -0.030*** -0.007*** -0.035** -0.040*** 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.002]  [0.004] [0.001] [0.016] [0.001] 
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Income  -0.000 0.000 0.084***  0.027*** 0.031*** 0.082*** 0.033*** 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]  [0.005] [0.002] [0.020] [0.002] 
Education (upper) 0.023 -0.111*** 0.263***  -0.064** 0.359*** 0.740*** 0.117*** 
 [0.025] [0.034] [0.021]  [0.032] [0.012] [0.142] [0.013] 
Education (middle) -0.031 -0.164*** 0.191***  0.054* 0.134*** 0.477*** 0.041*** 
 [0.021] [0.028] [0.018]  [0.028] [0.010] [0.143] [0.011] 
Social trust 0.141*** 0.076*** 0.146***  0.051** 0.053*** 0.178* 0.105*** 
 [0.020] [0.027] [0.016]  [0.024] [0.009] [0.099] [0.010] 
Country FE ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Wave FE ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Religion FE ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
         
Observations 113,780 44,842 117,140  72,118 119,982 5,239 119,800 
R-squared 0.127 0.101 0.096  0.127 0.117 0.057 0.160 
Number of countries 72 43 73  52 75 4 75 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results based on data from the World Values Survey. The unit of analysis is individual. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Respondents whose answers are coded as “don’t know”, “no answer”, “missing, unknown”, “not asked in survey” and “not applicable” are excluded 
in the regressions. More details on variables’ description are presented in the online appendix. 
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Table 10. A mechanism analysis 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Panel A. The effect of LGBT inclusion on innovation, controlling for a channel of influence 
        
LGBT 0.173***  0.207***  0.210***  0.226*** 
 [0.041]  [0.047]  [0.046]  [0.059] 
Human capital index 3.089***       
 [0.398]       
Years of schooling   0.129***     
   [0.025]     
Cognitive abilities     0.580***   
     [0.102]   
National IQs       0.031*** 
       [0.007] 
Baseline controls ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔ 
Observations 107  95  65  80 
R-squared 0.817  0.778  0.729  0.750 
 
       
Panel B. The effect of LGBT inclusion on human capital skills, a channel of influence 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable Human capital 
index  
Years of 
schooling  
Cognitive 
abilities  
National 
IQs 
        
LGBT  0.051***  0.776***  0.128**  3.668*** 
 [0.008]  [0.191]  [0.051]  [0.697] 
Baseline controls ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔ 
        
Observations 107  95  65  80 
R-squared 0.631  0.503  0.429  0.513 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. A sensitivity test for the results reported in Panel B of this table 
is presented in Table A1 in the online appendix. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
